Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies

2015

Is Organismic Fitness at the Basis of Evolutionary Theory?
Charles H. Pence
Louisiana State University, cpence@lsu.edu

Grant Ramsey
KU Leuven

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/prs_pubs
Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Pence, C. H., & Ramsey, G. (2015). Is Organismic Fitness at the Basis of Evolutionary Theory?. Retrieved
from https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/prs_pubs/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies at LSU
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact ir@lsu.edu.

Is Organismic Fitness at the Basis
of Evolutionary Theory?
Charles H. Pence and Grant Ramsey*y
Fitness is a central theoretical concept in evolutionary theory. Despite its importance,
much debate has occurred over how to conceptualize and formalize ﬁtness. One point of
debate concerns the roles of organismic and trait ﬁtness. In a recent addition to this
debate, Elliott Sober argues that trait ﬁtness is the central ﬁtness concept, and that organismic ﬁtness is of little value. In this paper, by contrast, we argue that it is organismic ﬁtness that lies at the bases of both the conceptual role of ﬁtness and its role as a
measure of evolutionary dynamics.

1. Introduction. In a recent paper, Elliott Sober argues that the ﬁtness of
individual organisms in the sense usually described by propensity theorists is useless to the actual practice of evolutionary biology. Rather, the
crucial sense of ﬁtness for the study of evolution is the ﬁtness of traits, and
it is “population-level variation in [trait] ﬁtness”—rather than the absolute
value of trait ﬁtness—“that is a causal propensity” (Sober 2013, 337).
Indeed, Sober argues that only for variations in trait ﬁtness can a tenable
propensity interpretation be constructed; there exists no consistent propensity account of trait ﬁtnesses themselves.
Sober’s argument has much to recommend it. First and foremost, his
clarity regarding the distinction between individual ﬁtness and the ﬁtness of
traits, as well as the relationship between the two, has been sadly lacking in
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recent literature on ﬁtness.1 But we will argue here that his central thesis—
that individual ﬁtness is broadly irrelevant—is mistaken, and that this mistake arises as a result of confusion over the variety of roles that the notion of
ﬁtness plays in evolutionary theory. While trait ﬁtness is the salient concept
for some of the roles of ﬁtness, for other uses—and uses in which philosophers are particularly interested—it is individual ﬁtness that is the relevant
ﬁtness concept. Sober’s conclusion is thus too hasty; individual ﬁtness
remains vital to the practice of evolutionary biology and for the interpretation of evolutionary theory.
Many of the most important uses of ﬁtness fall under two categories.
First is what we will call a metrological role of ﬁtness—that is, ﬁtness’s role
as a quantitative measure in evolutionary studies. Biologists can measure
the realized ﬁtness of organisms by tallying such things as their lifetime
reproductive success, and they can measure trait ﬁtness by recording trait
changes over time.
Second is what we will call the conceptual role of ﬁtness—that is, ﬁtness
as an element of the causal or explanatory structure of evolutionary theory.
It is this sense of ﬁtness to which Abrams appeals when he says that “the
kind of ﬁtness relevant to natural selection is ﬁtness of types, that is, properties of organisms, since it is types that are heritable and selected for”
(2009, 751–52), and to which Pence and Ramsey appeal when they argue
that “organismic ﬁtness plays important roles in parts of ecology and evolutionary biology, and is the concept of ﬁtness underlying the [propensity interpretation of ﬁtness]” (2013, 871–72). Here we are considering a
deeper, interpretive question about natural selection: ﬁtness either plays
some sort of causal or explanatory role in the theory of evolution by natural
selection, or it does not—and if it does play a role, then the speciﬁcs of that
role need to be clariﬁed. It is this role of ﬁtness that we refer to as its
conceptual usage.
Keeping this distinction in mind, then, our argument proceeds as follows.
In section 2, we argue that there exist three common conceptions of trait
ﬁtness—and each of these, in turn, is parasitic on individual ﬁtness, making
1. While the debate over biological individuality and the levels of selection is undeniably relevant to work on the concept of ﬁtness (Bouchard and Huneman 2013), the
term ‘individual’ should be taken to be equivalent to ‘organism’ in the following. Further, in his paper, Sober refers to organismic ﬁtness as “token” ﬁtness, while trait ﬁtness
is referred to as “type” ﬁtness. We avoid these locutions for several reasons. First, one
could construct “type-organism” concepts of ﬁtness. Second, while traits are something
like “types” in the sense familiar from metaphysics, they are restricted to particular
populations and environments (i.e., we are not interested in the ﬁtness of the type
“organism with brown fur,” but in the ﬁtness of the trait “brown fur” within a population,
in an environment, at a given time). To avoid these (and other) complications, we will
refer exclusively to trait and organismic (or individual) ﬁtness in the following.
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individual ﬁtness the fundamental notion of ﬁtness in the conceptual role. In
section 3, we argue that in the metrological role, the situation is less clear—
there are certainly studies in which trait ﬁtness is the more important concept. But it is, we claim, far from true that, as Sober argues, “evolutionary
biology has little use for [individual] ﬁtness” (2013, 336). In a wide variety
of examples, we argue, it is indeed the ﬁtness of individual organisms that
biologists look to measure, even when they make inferences about the ﬁtness of traits from those measurements. Individual ﬁtness is therefore fundamental in the conceptual role and useful in the metrological role and
should thus, contra Sober, by no means be rejected outright.
2. The Conceptual Role of Organismic Fitness. In order to understand the
conceptual role of organismic ﬁtness in evolutionary theory, we must know
what trait ﬁtness is and how it is related to organismic ﬁtness. We will
therefore begin by reviewing the uses of trait ﬁtness in its conceptual role
in the philosophical literature. We will then show how these concepts are
related to one another and to organismic ﬁtness, ﬁnally arguing that organismic ﬁtness lies at the conceptual basis of each of the trait ﬁtness concepts
and is therefore at the conceptual basis of the theory of evolution by natural
selection.
2.1. Three Concepts of Trait Fitness. We will introduce three deﬁnitions intended to capture the core conceptual usage of trait ﬁtness. Nothing
in this section should, notably, strike philosophers of biology as particularly
surprising or controversial, since these three deﬁnitions of trait ﬁtness appear throughout philosophical work on ﬁtness and natural selection.2 Further, and importantly, as we will note at the end of this section, these three
deﬁnitions are often interchanged with one another. Despite the fact that
these deﬁnitions are often treated as terminological variants, we suggest that
they are in fact in profound tension, and their being used interchangeably is
deeply problematic.
The ﬁrst concept of trait ﬁtness holds that the ﬁtness of a trait is the
average of the ﬁtness values of the individuals that carry the trait:
(TF1) The ﬁtness of a trait t is equal to the average individual (organismic)
ﬁtness values of individuals bearing t.

2. Notably, they also appear throughout—and are used on both sides of—the debate
between “causal” and “statistical” interpretations of evolutionary theory. We do not
intend anything here to privilege or argue for one of these two positions over the other;
these deﬁnitions could describe either causally potent or causally impotent concepts.
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Commitment to TF1 is widespread and quite explicit. To take one example,
Sober (2001) notes a tendency for equivocation between individual and trait
ﬁtness. He then asserts, however, that the choice of trait or individual ﬁtness is merely semantic, because the two are related by TF1. That is, “the
ﬁtness value of a trait is the average of the ﬁtness values of the individuals
that have the trait” (26). Many other authors also explicitly adopt this definition, including Mills and Beatty (1979, 276), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew
(2002, 462), Abrams (2009, 752), and Godfrey-Smith (2009, 21).
Second, spurred by the usage of ﬁtness within population genetics, trait
ﬁtness is often deﬁnitionally linked to trait dynamics:
(TF2) The ﬁtness value of a trait is a quantity that is, given some model of
population dynamics, predictive of the future dynamics of that trait in a
population.

This ﬁnally lets us cash out some of the value of trait ﬁtness. We want trait
ﬁtness to enable us to predict that, in a given population, the ﬁtter traits will,
all other things being equal, tend to drive out the less ﬁt.
In biological terms, TF2 is nebulous, since “future trait dynamics” is a
multivalent concept. There are countless models connecting ﬁtness to future outcomes, and there are countless future outcomes we might want to
observe, from the simple fraction of a trait in a population to times to extinction or ﬁxation. For our purposes, we intend TF2 not to pick out any
one of these as privileged, but as a highly general deﬁnition of trait ﬁtness:
whatever we might think that trait ﬁtness is, it must give us some (reasonably accurate) handle on future trait dynamics. Consider, for example,
the way in which trait ﬁtness is deﬁned in the population genetics literature.
In the simplest models of population genetics—haploid organisms reproducing asexually in discrete time without overlapping generations—the
“Darwinian ﬁtness,” w, may directly provide us with the future proportion
at some time t of two competing alleles in a population, pt /qt, given their
initial proportion (Hartl and Clark 1997, 215):
pt =qt ¼ wt ⋅ p0 =q0 :

ð1Þ

In this and many other models of population genetics, the Darwinian ﬁtness
is effectively deﬁnitionally connected to the changes in allele frequencies
over generational time. TF2, when used by philosophers, seems to capture
their concern for preserving this usage of ﬁtness in population genetics.
If TF2 does not hold, it is often argued, there is no reason to bother with
trait ﬁtness in the ﬁrst place. A good example here is the work of Ariew and
Ernst, who argue that we “employ the concept of ﬁtness when we want to
explain why a trait spreads through a population when it does,” and that it is
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a condition of the adequacy of a ﬁtness concept that it “enable us to compare the degree to which natural selection will favor the spread of one trait
over another, alternative trait” (2009, 290).3
The third concept of trait ﬁtness invokes ﬁtness’s colloquial usage as a
description of the “advantage” or “beneﬁt” that an individual organism receives in virtue of possessing a trait:
(TF3) Trait ﬁtness is the reproductive advantage to the individual conferred
by possessing the trait.

This deﬁnition echoes the original usage of ‘ﬁtness’ in evolutionary
theory—the fact that organisms bearing some traits are “better ﬁtted” to
their environment than those with other traits (Darwin 1859).
2.2. The Relationship between TF1, TF2, and TF3. Before we consider the relationship between organismic ﬁtness and TF1–TF3, we will
brieﬂy consider the relationship between these trait ﬁtness concepts. These
deﬁnitions are often conﬂated in the literature, and our analysis here shows
that such conﬂations are deeply problematic.
Consider the pictures of trait ﬁtness invoked by TF1 and TF2. If TF1 is
the operative deﬁnition of trait ﬁtness, then trait ﬁtnesses, taken to be
averages of individual ﬁtness values, are just one of the causal inﬂuences
responsible for determining future trait frequencies. But now turn to the
case of TF2. If a model like equation (1) deﬁnes trait ﬁtness, then trait
ﬁtness includes the effect of (at least) heritability—future trait frequencies
are determined only by current trait frequencies and current trait ﬁtnesses.
Trait ﬁtness in the sense of TF1 does not include the impact of heritability,
but trait ﬁtness as TF2 does. In many populations, therefore, TF1 and TF2
will result in different values for the ﬁtnesses of traits.
The same argument applies to the relationship between TF2 and TF3. If
a trait has a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to individual organisms, yet is not (or not
efﬁciently) transmitted from parents to offspring, then the TF3-ﬁtness of
that trait may be high while its TF2-ﬁtness remains low.
Finally, the relationship between TF1 and TF3 is similarly complex.
Consider a trait that constitutes a fairly minor beneﬁt to organisms and the
TF3-ﬁtness of which is hence relatively small. If this trait were to occur
only in organisms possessing an otherwise extremely ﬁt genetic background, then the TF1-ﬁtness of the trait might nonetheless be quite high. As
another example, a novel trait could be instantiated in a sterile individual.
In such a case, this trait would have a TF2-ﬁtness of zero, as the only in3. Explicit mentions of TF2 also appear in Abrams (2009, 752) and Krimbas (2004,
188).
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dividual organism bearing it will have no offspring whatsoever and hence
has an individual ﬁtness value of zero. And this would be true regardless
of the trait’s TF3-ﬁtness value. The average ﬁtness of the individuals bearing a trait can be large (or small), that is, without the effect on individuals
being positive and large (or negative and deleterious) in all cases.4
It is also noteworthy that the ranges of possible values for these different
notions of trait ﬁtness differ.5 Individual ﬁtness values can only be positive
numbers (an individual cannot have negative ﬁtness), so the TF1-ﬁtness of
a trait can only be positive. The TF2-ﬁtness or TF3-ﬁtness of a trait, on the
other hand, can clearly be negative—if a trait is declining in frequency
within a population, or if it is deleterious to the individual who holds it,
then its TF2- or TF3-ﬁtness values, respectively, will be less than zero.
2.3. The Relationship between Trait and Individual Fitness. It is clear,
owing to both the extensive use of trait ﬁtness in the literature and the wide
variety of ways in which it is deﬁned, that Sober is quite right to argue that
trait ﬁtness is an important component of the conceptual foundations of
evolutionary theory. But, as noted in the introduction, we take issue with his
claim that trait ﬁtness is the conceptually fundamental notion of ﬁtness in
evolutionary theory. We will now demonstrate that, for each of the three
deﬁnitions we offered of trait ﬁtness above, organismic ﬁtness is the conceptually fundamental concept. While trait ﬁtness concepts are valuable,
individual ﬁtness serves as the conceptual foundation for all our uses of
ﬁtness in evolutionary theory.
Consider ﬁrst TF3. In order to properly apply TF3 to a particular trait,
we need to have a grasp on the appropriate notion of “beneﬁt to the individual.”6 How are we to understand such a concept? As mentioned above,
many possible “beneﬁts” can be conceived. They all have one important
characteristic in common, however—all will involve references to the ﬁtness of individual organisms. Precisely the challenge of developing a model
of individual ﬁtness is to determine the way in which various putatively
4. Further instances of this sort can be constructed by appealing to the effects of variance on ﬁtness, as described by Gillespie (1974), or by considering cases of pleiotropy—a pleiotropic trait can have only one TF1-ﬁtness (the average of its varying effects on organisms with different genetic backgrounds), but its TF3-ﬁtness might vary
radically across those different organisms.
5. Normalizing these values could, of course, solve this, but this approach is not taken
in the literature.
6. One could, conceivably, have a “type”-based notion of TF3, where the discussion of
“beneﬁt” was of “beneﬁt to the type” (thanks to Elliott Sober for pointing out this
possibility). It is not clear to us, though, that this would resolve the issues raised here: it
does not seem plausible that one could somehow discover what the beneﬁt to a type of
individual is without clarifying the beneﬁt to token individuals.
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beneﬁcial inﬂuences should be factored into the overall picture offered by
ﬁtness. Importantly, though, it is precisely this work that needs to be performed in order to clarify the notion of “beneﬁt to the individual” that is
invoked by TF3. To put the point differently, the work of fully specifying
TF3 to the extent that it can actually be used to describe any particular trait
will require the construction of a measure of beneﬁt to the individual. This,
in turn, just is the construction of a model of individual ﬁtness. However
TF3’s invocation of beneﬁt might be cashed out, then, it will ultimately
depend on some concept of individual ﬁtness.7
The conceptual dependence of TF1 on individual ﬁtness is nearly trivial—if trait ﬁtness simply is the average of individual ﬁtness values, then
individual ﬁtness is assuredly the conceptually fundamental notion for TF1.
On TF1, trait ﬁtnesses can be deﬁned in terms of individual ﬁtnesses, but
the converse is impossible. Similarly, information about individual ﬁtness
can derive TF2 values, but TF2 values cannot derive individual ﬁtness
values.
The most difﬁcult case is TF2. As Sober noted, TF2-ﬁtness is in fact a
fairly heterogeneous property, including such effects as heritability and individual ﬁtness. The question at hand is whether, as for TF1 and TF3, individual ﬁtness also lies at the conceptual basis of TF2. We contend that
this is indeed the case. Our argument for this conclusion is that when TF2
is analyzed, individual ﬁtness is one of its core components, but not vice
versa. To see this, consider that TF2 is a rate of change in a population. If
we ask what underlies this rate of change, the answer will involve several
components. If there is immigration, then the immigrants can change trait
frequencies. Similarly, emigration can change frequencies, especially if
there is a difference in the propensity of different types in the population
to emigrate. Mutations and transmission biases, though often small effects,
can also change population trait frequencies. All of these factors can change
the way in which natural selection operates—but none of them are natural
selection, and one of the main causes of trait frequency change (or stability)
remains the individual ﬁtness values of the organisms in the population.
Although there can be TF2 values in the absence of individual ﬁtness
differences, such TF2 values would not indicate an adaptive response. Instead, they are merely due to migration, mutation, and so forth. It is thus
true that when we analyze TF2, organismic ﬁtness is not just an important
factor but the central factor for understanding the adaptive import of TF2
values.
Now consider individual ﬁtness. Is TF2 at its basis? The answer is no:
individuals have ﬁtness values that help lead to TF2 values, but because
7. For a discussion of some of the problems that models of individual ﬁtness need to
overcome, see Sober (2001), Abrams (2009), and Pence and Ramsey (2013).
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TF2 takes into account population factors like mutation and migration, and
because such factors are extrinsic to the propensities of individuals to survive and reproduce, there is no sense in which TF2 lies at the conceptual
foundation of organismic ﬁtness. While it is true that organisms are built out
of traits, and it is these traits that crucially determine organismic ﬁtness
values, it is not true that trait ﬁtness determines organismic ﬁtness values.
TF2 and organismic ﬁtness clearly bear an asymmetric relation to one
another, and it is organismic ﬁtness that is conceptually primary.
We should pause here to deal with one objection. A response to this
discussion of TF2 might run as follows: Of course TF2 is not a complete account of the ﬁtness of traits—we need to include explicit accounts of other
properties, such as heritability, population/trait dynamics, and so forth. Once
enough of these factors have been considered, only then can we say that
we’ve arrived at a true account of trait ﬁtness.8 Our reply to this objection
is that it seems to invoke something like a limiting process, where we begin with the limited information offered to us by TF2 and add to it until we
have arrived at a “complete” picture. But in what would this complete
picture consist? It seems, we claim, that some notion like the concept of
“beneﬁt to the individual” invoked by TF3 must be the “target” of the limit,
and this would therefore collapse a TF2-notion of trait ﬁtness into one based
on TF3. In this case, all the arguments that we deploy with TF3 would then
apply.
It is thus clear that, however we choose to deﬁne trait ﬁtness, we are left
with a notion of trait ﬁtness that fundamentally depends on the concept of
individual ﬁtness. As far as the conceptual role of trait ﬁtness is concerned,
then, it is the case that individual ﬁtness always stands conceptually prior
to trait ﬁtness.
Of course, as mentioned above, the conceptual role is not the only one in
which trait ﬁtness features. When Sober argues that “biologists don’t bother
with the ﬁtness of Charlie the Tuna, though they may want to discuss the
ﬁtness of tuna dorsal ﬁns” (2013, 337), he presumably means that individual ﬁtnesses are of little to no use in the empirical arena, or for what we
called the metrological role of trait ﬁtness. It is to this role that we now turn.
3. The Metrological Role of Organismic Fitness. At ﬁrst blush, it would
seem that Sober’s argument against the usefulness of organismic ﬁtness
rests on entirely plausible premises. The ﬁtness of organisms is typically
inaccessible. This is because “organisms taste of life but once” (Sober 2013,
337). Sober’s argument seems to say that even though organisms have
ﬁtness values, unless the values are zero (through infertility, say), we cannot
measure them. We saw in the ﬁrst section that this measurement-focused
8. Thanks to Elliott Sober for offering this response.
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(metrological) role of individual ﬁtness can be distinguished from its conceptual role. Because of this, individual ﬁtness can clearly be the conceptual foundation of evolutionary theory even if it is not readily measurable.
In this section, however, we would like to address the metrological question. Is it really true that biologists never care about or measure the ﬁtness
of Charlie the Tuna?
One excellent resource for gauging the degree to which individual ﬁtness plays a role in evolutionary studies comes from Endler’s (1986) classic monograph on the study of natural selection in the wild. In chapter 3,
Endler identiﬁes 10 distinct methods for studying natural selection in the
wild. These methods vary from method I, which seeks correlations between
environmental factors and traits, to method X, which compares optimization
models with actual trait distributions. It is clear that for some of the methods, it is traits that are central, not individual organisms and their ﬁtness
values. But for at least some of the methods, the ﬁtness of individual organisms plays a central role. Consider method VII, cohort analysis. In Endler’s words, “By gathering detailed data on individuals, data can be obtained
on survivorship, fertility, fecundity, mating ability, and so on. Data on parents and offspring can also provide information on genetics (condition c
for natural selection, inheritance). Data are best gathered from individually
marked individuals, though some information can be gained by giving
all members of the same cohort the same mark” (1986, 81). This method
clearly focuses on individual ﬁtness. But in order for method VII to serve as
a counterexample to Sober, we will need some sense of how often this
method is used in studies of natural selection in the wild.
Method VII is not one that is easy to perform, especially for some taxa. As
Endler notes, it “can be the most laborious method” (1986, 81). Does the
fact that it is this laborious, however, mean that it is so useless that, as Sober
argues, biologists need not (or cannot) bother with attempting to measure
individual ﬁtness values? Fortunately for us, Endler took the trouble to
conduct a thorough survey of studies directly demonstrating natural selection in the wild. His table 5.1 lists 139 species along with the methods
used in the study of each species, as well as the publications that have described these studies. If Sober is right that individual ﬁtness is worthless,
we should ﬁnd that few or none of the studies listed in the table employ
method VII. It turns out, however, that a majority of the species (∼57%)
listed in the table have had natural selection demonstrated in populations
via method VII, that is, 79 species mention VII as a method in their studies.
Method VIII, which also sometimes focuses on individual ﬁtness (though
combined together into “age classes” of individuals), is mentioned for
57 species. If we subtract the 18 species whose study has involved both VII
and VIII, we have a total of 118 species that have been subject to methods VII
or VIII, 85% of the total. Thus, if we assume that Endler’s list is represen-
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tative of the kind of studies conducted today, we cannot avoid the conclusion that individual ﬁtness dominates the metrological role of ﬁtness.
On the face of it, then, it seems that biologists wishing to demonstrate
natural selection in the wild do care about the ﬁtness of individuals. Charlie
the Tuna’s ﬁtness is worth measuring, after all. In the previous section we
showed that individual ﬁtness is at the conceptual foundation of evolutionary theory, and in this section we have shown that individual ﬁtness
plays important metrological roles in many (or even most) evolutionary
studies. The claim that individual ﬁtness is useless, then, is difﬁcult to maintain. Is the case closed on individual ﬁtness being the metrological and
conceptual foundation of evolutionary biology? Before we can draw this
conclusion, we should consider a case study, focusing on just what sort of
role individual ﬁtness actually plays in evolutionary studies of the type that
Endler cataloged.
Consider a typical method VII study, that of Booth (1995). Booth tattooed
damselﬁsh in a reef ecosystem and then tracked their fates. By following the
outcomes of individual life histories, the study was centered on individual
ﬁtness. The determination of individual ﬁtness was not, however, the aim of
the study. Rather, Booth was trying to determine the impact of grouping
behavior on individual ﬁtness. Is it a ﬁtness advantage to be prone to join
groups? And are larger or smaller groups the best ones to join? In terms of
our TF1–TF3 framework, we can understand the study as proceeding this
way: Individuals are identiﬁed, and their ﬁtness values are recorded along
with traits of interest (in this case the characters of the groups they belong
to). The data from similar individuals can then be averaged, resulting in the
TF1-ﬁtness of the traits measured. This average was then used to parameterize models that offered predictions about future evolutionary dynamics
(TF2) and also to estimate the impact that various group sizes have on the
individual (TF3).
Thus, just as biologists will be more interested in how dorsal ﬁns affect
tuna ﬁtness than the ﬁtness of an individual tuna, they will also be more
interested in the ﬁtness effect of particular traits (like tending to join large
groups) than in the ﬁtness of particular damselﬁsh. In such cases, individual
ﬁtness is frequently used as a means of exploring questions about the evolution of traits. But even if this is true, it still does not mean that individual
ﬁtness does not play an important role. In fact, we hope to have shown that
the ﬁtness of individuals serves as the basis for the demonstration of natural
selection in a large percentage of these kinds of empirical studies. This is
perhaps to be expected if, as we argued in section 2, individual ﬁtness lies at
the conceptual basis of evolutionary theory.
4. Conclusion. We have argued against Sober’s contention that individual
ﬁtness is useless to the practice of evolutionary biology. While we agree that
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trait ﬁtness is sometimes the biologist’s sole focus, two facts make Sober’s
claim incorrect. First, conceptually, each of the three common deﬁnitions of
trait ﬁtness in fact conceptually relies on the ﬁtness of individual organisms.
Organismic ﬁtness thus lies at the conceptual basis of trait ﬁtness. And
second, even when biologists are attempting to measure the ﬁtness of traits,
they often do so in ways that rely, either tacitly or explicitly, on organismic
ﬁtness, making it fundamental as well for the metrological role of trait ﬁtness. Organismic ﬁtness, therefore, is crucial to both the theory and practice
of evolutionary biology.
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